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Defusing a Ticking Time Bomb: 
The Complicated Considerations Underlying  
Compulsory Human Genetic Editing 
 




Gene editing is a type of genetic engineering that enables scientists to 
change an organism’s DNA by adding, removing, or altering genetic 
material at particular locations in the human genome.  While these editing 
technologies are in their infancy, they hold great promise for future 
applications. They also raise many moral, ethical, and legal questions. 
Fast forward 10 years.  In utero gene editing is effective, safe, and 
inexpensive (or covered by insurance).  A couple with strong religious 
views against gene editing decides to procreate despite knowing, via family 
history, they are both homozygous dominant for the allele that causes 
Huntington’s disease (an autosomal dominant disease), and therefore the 
child will have a 100% likelihood of inheriting the disease (barring a highly 
unlikely, unforeseen mutation eliminating the inherited disorder).  The 
couple undergoes genetic testing of the fetus, which confirms the fetus is 
homozygous dominant for Huntington’s disease.  The couple’s physician 
recommends a gene editing treatment to “fix” the fetus’s genes.  The 
couple declines the treatment on religious grounds, knowing full well the 
spectrum of health risks and symptoms their child will face.  The child is 
born with Huntington’s disease and suffers the expected health issues.  Safe 
post-birth gene therapy for Huntington’s is not available. 
In a situation like the one above, what liability do parents face if there 
is a state statute requiring gene editing in circumstances such as these?  If 
there is no such statute, should courts determine that parents have an 
affirmative duty, via existing common law principles governing “special 
relationships,” to acquiesce to these procedures during pregnancy to avoid 
almost certain postnatal injury?  If so, what genetic issues are important 
 
 *  J.D. Candidate, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, class of 2019.  Arizona 
State University; BA, 2016, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, Pomona College.  The 
author would like to thank his parents for their never-wavering love and support in all his 
pursuits—academic and otherwise. 
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enough for this affirmative duty to be imposed?  What criminal liability do 
parents potentially face under existing causes of action?  What types of 
civil actions might the affected child bring against his or her parent(s)?  
Does the state or the child even have the standing to bring a suit?  If the 
standing requirement is met, how might courts reconcile parents’ potential 
affirmative duty to acquiesce to gene editing treatment with parents’ 
constitutionally-based arguments in opposition (e.g., free exercise of 
religion, privacy rights under Roe v. Wade and its progeny, etc.)?  These 
questions, and related topics, are addressed below. 
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Curing a presently irremediable genetic-related disease by “fixing” a 
“bad gene” might seem like science fiction.  However, a group of 
developing technologies, known as gene editing, enable scientists to change 
and, therefore, fix an organism’s DNA by adding, removing, or altering 
genetic material at particular locations in the human genome.1  
Collectively, these technologies have the potential to be one of the most 
significant medical advances in recent history.2  Experts have suggested 
 
 1.  What Are Genome Editing and CRISPR-Cas9?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (Apr. 
11, 2018), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/genomicresearch/genomeediting; see also How Is 
Genome Editing Used?, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.geno 
me.gov/27569224/how-is-genome-editing-used/. 
 2.  Victor Tangermann, A CRISPR Future, FUTURISM (Jan. 30, 2018), https://futur 
ism.com/crispr-genetic-engineering-change-world/.  Gene-editing has many other potential 
applications, including the repair of old or damaged organs.  No Pig in A Poke, ECONOMIST 
(Oct. 17, 2015), https://www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/21674493-gen 
ome-engineering-may-help-make-porcine-organs-suitable-use-people-no-pig.  This technology 
could save many lives, with an average of 20 people dying each day in the U.S. waiting for 
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these editing tools may have clinical utility for treating afflictions such as 
Huntington’s disease,3 sickle cell disease, cystic fibrosis, hemophilia, 
mental illness, heart disease, HIV/AIDS, and several types of cancer.4   
While these editing tools are in their infancy, research and 
development efforts have been accelerated by significant financial 
commitments from well-respected private sector investors.5  Recent 
developments indicate these technologies hold great promise for future 
applications,6 and several experts have noted that these technologies’ 
efficacy is rapidly progressing and clinical use is likely not far off.7 
Beyond its clinical benefits, gene editing holds great promise for 
halting and reversing the trajectory of skyrocketing medical costs8 by 
enabling proactive treatment addressing the root afflictions that cause 
 
viable organ transplants.  Organ Donation Statistics, ORGAN DONOR, https://www. 
organdonor.gov/statistics-stories/statistics.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2018). 
 3.  See Su Yang et al., CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Gene Editing Ameliorates 
Neurotoxicity in Mouse Model of Huntington’s Disease, 127 J. CLIN. INVEST. 2719, 2719 
(2017); see also CRISPR Reverses Huntington’s Disease in Mice, GEN (June 20, 2017), 
https://www.genengnews.com/gen-news-highlights/crispr-reverses-huntingtons-disease-in-
mice/81254532. 
 4.  What Are Genome Editing and CRISPR-Cas9, supra note 1; see also Edward 
Lanphier, Don’t Edit the Human Germ Line, 519 NATURE NEWS 410, 410–11 (2015). 
 5.  In 2015, a group of investors including Bill Gates, Google Ventures, Deerfield 
Management, Viking Global Investors, and T. Rowe Price Associates participated in a $120 
million funding round for Editas, a small company focused on CRISPR gene-editing.  
Matthew Herper, Bill Gates and 13 Other Investors Pour $120 Million into Revolutionary 
Gene-Editing Startup, FORBES (Aug. 10, 2015, 7:30 AM), https://www.forbes. com/sites/ 
matthewherper/2015/08/10/bill-gates-and-13-other-investors-pour-120-million-into-revolut 
ionary-gene-editing-startup/#15996f886369. 
 6.  See, e.g., Jocelyn Kaiser, A Human Has Been Injected with Gene-Editing Tools to 
Cure His Disabling Disease, SCIENCE (Nov. 15, 2016, 6:00 PM), http://www. 
sciencemag.org/news/2017/11/human-has-been-injected-gene-editing-tools-cure-his-disabl 
ing-disease-here-s-what-you (reporting that the first instance of in vivo gene editing was 
carried out in November 2017 to treat a 44-year-old man with Hunter’s Syndrome - a severe 
inherited metabolic disorder); see also James Gallagher, DNA Surgery on Embryos Removes 
Disease, BBC (Sept. 28, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/health-41386849 (reporting that 
for the first time, Chinese scientists, in September 2017, corrected a gene mutation in a 
human embryo for the inherited blood disorder beta thalassemia). 
 7.  Jacqueline Howards, Scientists Edit Gene for Blood Disease in Human Embryos, 
CNN (Sept. 29, 2017, 3:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/29/health/gene-edit-beta-
thalassemia-study. 
 8.  David Cutler, JAMA Forum: Rising Medical Costs Mean More Rough Times 
Ahead, NEWS@JAMA (June 23, 2017), https://newsatjama.jama.com/2017/06/23/jama-
forum-rising-medical-costs-mean-more-rough-times-ahead/. 
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prolonged medical problems.9  Some experts estimate that effective gene 
editing treatments would “save society hundreds of billions of dollars in 
health care costs every year.”10  New editing tools, like CRISPR, are 
making the editing process quicker, more precise, and less expensive.11 
Despite gene editing’s many potential positives, it also raises moral, 
ethical, safety, and legal questions, as it can be used for less ethically-
agreeable, therapeutic means, such as enhancing human traits or 
characteristics.12 
Fast-forward 10 years.  In utero gene editing is effective, safe, 
inexpensive and, perhaps, covered by insurance.13  A couple with strong 
religious views against gene editing decides to procreate despite knowing, 
via family history, they are both homozygous dominant14 for the allele that 
 
 9.  Thom Patterson, Unproven Medical Technique Could Save Countless Lives, 
Billions of Dollars, CNN (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/30/health/pioneers-
crispr-dna-genome-editing/index.html. 
 10. Id. 
 11.  Amy Dockser Marcus, DIY Gene Editing: Fast, Cheap—and Worrisome, WALL 
ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2017, 11:00 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/30/health/pioneers-crispr-
dna-genome-editing/index.html. 
 12.  See, e.g., What Are the Ethical Concerns About Genome Editing?, NAT’L HUM. 
GENOME RES. INST. (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.genome.gov/27569225/what-are-the-
ethical-concerns-about-genome-editing/ (discussing intelligence, height, or athletic ability as 
examples of non-therapeutic uses).  Some argue there are safer alternatives than in utero 
gene editing, namely preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and in vitro fertilization 
(IVF).  Lanphier, supra note 4, at 410-11.  PGD and IVF enable scientists to create multiple 
embryos in a lab, genetically test them, select one that has a “normal” genetic makeup, and 
implant that embryo into the would-be mother’s uterus.  Id.  However, in utero gene editing 
addresses certain issues that PGD and IVF cannot— including when both parents are 
homozygous (have two copies) for a disease-causing variant, when the disorder is 
polygenetic (influenced by more than one gene), and for families who have moral, ethical, 
or religious objections to the PGD/IVF process.  Id. 
 13.  While not a subject of this paper, there are concerns gene editing will not be 
covered by medical insurance and, therefore, won’t be affordable by many.  Jason Koebler, 
One Thing that Could Stop the Rise of Gene Editing: Insurance Companies, MOTHERBOARD 
(Apr. 12, 2016, 9:10 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/gv5vm9/will-insura 
nce-companies-cover-crispr-therapies-gene-editing. 
 14.  Because the Huntington’s disease trait is autosomal dominant, only one parent 
would need to be homozygous dominant (DD) for the Huntington’s disease trait to be 
passed on to all offspring, regardless of the status of the other partner.  Huntington Disease, 
GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/huntington-disease#inh 
eritance (last visited Apr. 11, 2018).  The mutant allele (DD) would expressively dominate 
the normal allele (dd) in 100% of progeny receiving it (DD x dd = Dd, Dd, Dd, Dd).  See 
Ivan Suarez Robles, Interactive Punnet[t] Square, HOPES HUNTINGTON’S DISEASE INFO. 
(March 8, 2015), http://www.web.stanford.edu/group/hopes/cgi-bin/hopes_test/interactive-
punnet-square/.  It would not require that both parents be homozygous dominant or that one 
be heterozygous dominant.  If both were heterozygous dominant (Dd), the offspring (Dd X 
Dd = DD, Dd, Dd, dd) would have a one in four chance of being homozygous dominant for 
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causes Huntington’s disease15 (an autosomal dominant disease), and 
therefore the child will have a 99% likelihood of inheriting the disease.16  
The couple undergoes genetic testing of the fetus, which confirms the fetus 
is homozygous dominant for Huntington’s disease.  The couple’s physician 
recommends a gene editing treatment to “fix” the fetus’s genes.  The 
couple declines the treatment on religious grounds, knowing full well the 
spectrum of health risks and symptoms their child will face.  The child is 
born with Huntington’s disease and suffers the expected health issues.  Safe 
post-birth gene therapy for Huntington’s is not available. 
What liability do parents face if there is a state statute requiring gene 
editing in circumstances such as outlined above (hereafter collectively 
referred to as the “Hypothetical”)?  If there is no such statute, should courts 
determine that parents have an affirmative duty, via existing common law 
principles governing “special relationships,” to acquiesce to these 
procedures during pregnancy to avoid almost certain postnatal injury?  If 
so, what genetic issues are important enough for this affirmative duty to be 
imposed?  What criminal liability do parents potentially face under existing 
causes of action?  What civil actions might the affected child bring against 
his or her parent(s)?  Does the state or the child have standing to bring a 
suit?  If the standing requirement is met, how might courts reconcile the 
parents’ affirmative duty to acquiesce to gene editing treatment with the 
parents’ constitutionally-based arguments in opposition (e.g., free exercise 
of religion, privacy rights under Roe v. Wade and its progeny, etc.)?  These 




To better understand the topics to be covered, an overview of human 




the trait, two in four chance of being heterozygous dominant for the trait, and a one in four 
chance of being homozygous recessive and not carrying the trait.  Id. 
 15.  Huntington’s disease is characterized by degeneration of nerve cells in the brain.  
Symptom manifests during an affected individual’s 30s and 40s and includes a breadth of 
motor, cognitive, and behavioral declines.  Mayo Clinic Staff, Huntington’s Disease, MAYO 
CLINIC (June 13, 2017), https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/huntingtons-
disease/symptoms-causes/syc-20356117. 
 16.  Homozygous dominant individuals are rare and experience more severe symptoms 
than heterozygous individuals.  Ferdinando Squitieri et al., Homozygosity for CAG Mutation 
in Huntington Disease Is Associated with a More Severe Clinical Course, 126 BRAIN 946, 
946 (2003). 
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A. Human Genetics 
 
An individual’s DNA sequence acts as his or her blueprint for growth, 
expressed characteristics, and functions.17  DNA consists of two strands of 
uniquely ordered nucleotides held together by four types of nitrogenous bases: 
cytosine (C), guanine (G), adenine (A), and thymine (T).18  These bases pair 
together - C with G, and A with T— and allow DNA to maintain its well-known 
double helix form.19 
 
 
Figure 1. DNA Base Pairs and Structure. 
 
Stretches of these nucleotides comprise genes.  There are several types 
of genes.20  Some genes that encode messenger RNA (mRNA) code for 
proteins, 21 while many other non-coding genes specify other types of RNA 
(e.g., transfer RNA or ribosomal RNA, among many others) that are 
 
 17.  What Is DNA?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/basics/ 
dna (last updated Nov. 28, 2017). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Nucleotides and Bases, GENETICS GENERATION, http://knowgenetics.org/nucle 
otides-and-bases/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2018). 
 20.  Michele Clamp et al., Distinguishing Protein-Coding and Noncoding Genes in the 
Human Genome, 104 PNAS 19428, 19428 (2007) (“The twofold challenge is to ensure that 
the [human gene] catalog includes all valid protein-coding genes and excludes putative 
entries that are not valid protein-coding genes”). 
 21.  What Is a Gene?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (Nov. 28, 2017), https://ghr.nlm 
.nih.gov/primer/basics/gene. 
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involved in the translation of mRNA into proteins and a variety of other 
regulatory functions.22 
Three base sequences in the DNA that code for proteins, comprised of 
amino acids, is called codons.23  There are 64 possible combinations of the 
four nucleotide bases into three base sequences.24  Three of these possible 
combinations code for stop codons, which terminate translation.25  The 
remaining 61 combinations code for the 20 amino acids that normally 
constitute proteins.26  Of these amino acids, three have six codons, two 
have single codons, one has three codons, and the rest have either two or 
four codons.27 
Even a slight variation in a gene’s coding can change the gene’s 
function by changing the normally coded-for protein.28   
 
 22.  Suzanne Clancy & William Brown, Translation: DNA to mRNA to Protein, 
NATURE, http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/translation-dna-to-mrna-to-protein-393 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2018). 
 23.  Protein Structure, NATURE, http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/protein-
structure-14122136 (last visited Apr. 12, 2018); see also Ann P. Smith, Nucleic Acids to 
Amino Acids, NATURE, http://nature.com/scitable/topicpage/nucleic-acids-to-amino-acids-
dna-specifies-935 (last visited Apr. 12, 2018). 
 24.  JEREMY M. BERG ET AL., BIOCHEMISTRY 7 (5th ed. 2002). 
 25.  The Information in DNA Determines Cellular Function via Translation, NATURE, 
http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/the-information-in-dna-determines-cellular-func 
tion-6523228 (last visited Apr. 12, 2018). 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  See Codon, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://britannica.com/science/codon (last 
visited April 12, 2018). 
 28.  Gene Expression, NATURE, https://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/gene-
expression-14121669 (last visited Apr. 11, 2018).  However, it is important to note that the 
effect a slight variation has on the gene’s function is dependent upon several factors 
including (1) the type of change; (2) whether it occurs in the coding or in the non-coding 
components implicated in regulating gene expression; and (3) if the variation occurs in part 
of the coding component, where the variation occurred.  See DNA Is Constantly Changing 
Through the Process of Mutation, NATURE, http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/dna-
is-constantly-changing-through-the-process-6524898 (last visited Apr. 11, 2018). 
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Figure 2. Three Mechanisms of Gene Mutation. 
 
Figure 2 shows the three main ways DNA-copying mechanisms can 
malfunction and miscopy a gene—by either adding, deleting, or 
substituting one or more nitrogenous bases.29  However, it is important to 
note that not every mutation changes a gene’s expression.30  It is possible 
for DNA to mutate at a single nucleotide and still code the same amino acid 
with no effect, which is referred to as a “silent mutation.”31 
 
B.  Gene Editing 
 
Gene editing seeks to use either somatic or germline therapy32 to 
silence or correct these “mistakes.”33  Both therapies are currently carried 
out using one of three main families of engineered nucleases:34 (1) zinc 
 
 29.  DNA Is Constantly Changing Through the Process of Mutation, supra note 28. 
 30.  Do All Gene Mutations Affect Health and Development?, GENETICS HOME 
REFERENCE (Sept. 25, 2018), http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/mutationsandisorders/neutral 
mutations. 
 31.  DNA Is Constantly Changing Through the Process of Mutation, supra note 28. 
 32.  How Is Genome Editing Used?, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (Aug. 3, 2017) 
https://www.genome.gov/27569224/how-is-genome-editing-used.  Somatic therapy targets 
non-reproductive cells, and, therefore, only affects the patient receiving the gene therapy 
(not potential progeny).  Id.  Germline therapies involve editing in reproductive cells (ex: 
eggs and sperm), with changes likely to be passed down to subsequent generations.  Id.  
This raises more ethical and moral challenges than somatic gene editing.  Id. 
 33.  See How Does Genome Editing Work?, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (Aug. 3, 
2017), https://www.genome.gov/27569223/how-does-genome-editing-work/. 
 34.  There is a fourth common family of engineered nucleases, Rapid Trait 
Development System (RTDS).  See Noel J. Sauer et al., Oligonucleotide-Directed 
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finger nucleases (ZFNs), (2) transcription activator-like effector-based 
nucleases (TALENs), and (3) the clustered regularly interspaced short 
palindromic repeats (CRISPR).35 
 
1. Zinc-finger Nucleases (ZFNs) 
 
ZFNs are a type of DNA-binding protein that facilitates gene editing by 
creating breaks in DNA’s double-helix structure at targeted locations.36  
The cell tries to repair a break by either nonhomologous end joining37 or 
homology-directed repair.38  Using ZFN’s, scientists are able to insert lab-
created DNA fragments into DNA gaps before the homology-directed 
repair mechanism of the cell provides its own patch of DNA to fill the 
gap.39  This will, at least, theoretically alter the gene expression back to 
“normal.” 
While ZFNs recently made national headlines for the technology’s use 
in the first U.S.-based in-patient gene editing trial,40 the use of ZFNs 
remains limited because they are expensive41 and difficult to design, engineer, 
and construct.42  Furthermore, a new ZFN needs to be engineered for each 
 
Mutagenesis for Precision Gene Editing, 14 PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY J. 496, 496 (2016).  
However, this genome editing technology is currently used exclusively in plants and yeast.  
Id.  As such, it is not relevant to the hypothetical proposed in this article. 
 35.  Thomas Gaj et al., ZFN, TALEN, and CRISPR/Cas-Based Methods for Genome 
Engineering, 31 TRENDS BIOTECHNOLOGY 397, 398–402 (2013). 
 36.  How Does Genome Editing Work?, supra note 33. 
 37.  “Nonhomologous end joining” occurs when the cell takes the two ends of the DNA 
strand that has been broken, and seals them together.  Dana Carroll, Genome Engineering 
with Targetable Nucleases, 83 ANN. REV. BIOCHEMISTRY 409, 420–21 (2014).  This can 
cause frame shifts, consequently causing alterations to the DNA code and protein.  TERENCE 
A. BROWN, GENOMES § 14.1.1 (2d ed. 2002), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/ 
NBK21114/. 
 38.  Homology-directed repair is where a cell tries to repair a DNA break by filling in 
the gap with a copy of the original sequence.  Carroll, supra note 37, at 420–21. 
 39.  Id. at 412–14; see also Cherie L. Ramirez et al., Engineered Zinc Finger Nickases 
Induce Homology-Directed Repair with Reduced Mutagenic Effects, 40 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES. 
5560, 5560 (2012). 
 40.  Marilynn Marchione, 2nd Man Undergoes Gene Editing; No Major Side Effects 
Showing So Far, N.J. HERALD (Feb. 8, 2018, 12:01 AM), http://www.njherald.com/ 
20180208/2nd-man-undergoes-gene-editing—-no-major-side-effects-showing-so-far. 
 41.  Rozina Sabur, First Gene-Editing Attempted in Human Body to Cure Disease, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/16/first-gene-
editing-attempted-human-body-cure-disease/ (“Zinc finger nucleases are an older and more 
expensive tool for gene editing than CRISPR genome editing.”). 
 42.  NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., supra note 33. 
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DNA target sequence, decreasing likelihood ZFNs could be scaled up for 
mass use.43  
  
2.   Transcription Activator-like Effector Nucleases (TALENs) 
 
TALENs are similar to ZFNs in that both technologies are engineered 
from naturally occurring proteins capable of binding to specified DNA 
segments.44  Specifically, TALENs are nucleases built from arrays of 33-34 
amino acid modules that have a strong recognition of specific nucleotides.45  
These modules can be customized to target almost any DNA sequence (and 
therefore gene mutation).46  The TALEN cuts the targeted DNA sequence, 
which induces the cell’s repair mechanisms of either non-homologous end 
joining or homology-directed repair.47  TALENs have the added benefit of 
being easier and less expensive to engineer than ZFNs.48 
 
3.   Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR) 
System 
 
CRISPR-Cas9 (“CRISPR”) is the most recently developed high-profile 
gene-editing technology.  CRISPR was adapted from a gene editing system 
that naturally occurs in bacteria.49  This system seizes fragments of DNA 
from invading viruses and uses these fragments to create DNA segments 
known as “CRISPR arrays.”50  If the original (or similar) virus attacks again, the 
CRISPR arrays enable the bacteria to recognize the virus and respond by 
producing RNA segments that use the Cas9 enzyme (or similar)51 to target 
 
 43.  Jeffrey M. Perkel, Genome Editing with CRISPRs, TALENs and ZRNs, 
BIOCOMPARE (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.biocompare.com/Editorial-Articles/144186-
Genome-Editing-with-CRISPRs-TALENs-and-ZFNs/. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  See supra notes 37 and 38 and accompanying text; see also Carroll, supra note 37, 
at 410–11. 
 48.  Perkel, supra note 43. 
 49.  Eric S. Lander, The Heroes of CRISPR, 164 CELL 18, 18–22 (2016). 
 50.  Id. at 22. 
 51.  A new nuclease has been identified for use with the CRISPR-Cas13 enzyme.  Ruth 
Williams, RNA Editing Possible with CRISPR-Cas13, THE SCIENTIST (Oct. 25, 2017), 
https://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/50719/title/RNA-Editing-Possible-
with-CRISPR-Cas13/. 
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and cut the virus’s DNA (thereby disabling it).52  In essence, CRISPR acts 
as the bacteria’s immune system, killing the invading virus.53 
CRISPR-Cas9 works similarly in the lab, where scientists create a short 
“guide” RNA sequence that binds to a determined DNA target sequence 
and to the Cas9 enzyme.54  The resulting RNA is used to recognize the 
targeted DNA sequence, which the Cas9 enzyme then cuts.55  After the 
DNA is cut, researchers utilize the cell’s own DNA repair mechanisms to 
add or delete segments of genetic material.  This is done either (1) by 
utilizing the cell’s response of non-homologous end joining to silence 
problem genes by inserting or deleting genetic material during the repair 
process,56 or (2) by using homology-directed repair to insert a lab-created 
DNA sequence into the void.57 
 
 
Figure 3. Gene Editing Overview. 
 
CRISPR technology has been praised for being less expensive, more 
accurate, and more efficient than other gene editing methods.58  CRISPR’s 
benefits include ease of customization and its abilities to simultaneously 
target multiple genes and cut DNA strands on its own (whereas other gene 
editing techniques require separate cleaving enzymes to do this).59  
CRISPR’s increased efficiency is evidenced by a study that found CRISPR 
 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Lander, supra note 49, at 18. 
 54.  Carroll, supra note 37, at 416. 
 55.  Id.  While Cas9 is the most commonly used enzyme for this process, other 
enzymes are also used.  What Are Genome Editing and CRISPR-Cas9?, supra note 1. 
 56.  Carroll, supra note 37, at 415-16. 
 57.  See id.  During this process, the cell typically inserts free-floating genetic material 
into the void created by the enzyme cut.  Id. 
 58.  Questions and Answers About CRISPR, BROAD INST., https://www.broad 
institute.org/what-broad/areas-focus/project-spotlight/questions-and-answers-about-crispr 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2017). 
 59.  Id. 
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With a better technical understanding of how gene editing works, we 
now turn to the relevant legal principles and considerations.  The parents in 
our Hypothetical may face both criminal and civil liability61 depending 
upon (1) whether the child or state has sufficient standing to bring a case 
against the parents, (2) whether a statute exists that requires gene editing in 
certain instances, (3) whether a court finds (in the absence of such a statute) 
the parents had an affirmative duty of care to the child, and (4) if such a 
duty exists, that the affirmative duty was sufficient to require the parents to 
acquiesce to gene editing. 
This paper will focus on duty and breach, with a brief discussion of 
causation62 and damages within a civil context.  The following sections that 
follow focus on current criminal causes of action that the state might bring 
against parents, and civil causes of action comparable to those a child 
might try to bring against his or her parents. 
 
A. Does the Child or State Have Standing to Bring Suit? 
 
Before addressing the viability of civil or criminal causes of action, the 
party bringing suit against the parents—the child or the State—must first 
 
 60.  Gaurav K. Varshney et al., High-Throughput Gene Targeting and Phenotyping in 
Zebrafish Using CRISPR/Cas9, 25 GENOME RES. 1030, 1030 (2015). 
 61.  While far more cases address parents’ criminal liability for breaching an 
affirmative duty owed to their children, the dearth of civil cases does not mean that currently 
existing legal principles do not support civil liability.  Vincent R. Johnson & Claire G. 
Hargrove, The Tort Duty of Parents to Protect Minor Children, 51 VILL. L. REV. 311, 317–
19 (2006). 
 62.  Causation is not covered in depth as the technology implicated in a case like the 
one proposed in the Hypothetical has yet to be developed.  What we know is that the 
evidence of causation will be heavily scientific in nature, therefore implicating the Daubert 
Standard.  See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) 
(interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which states “If scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine 
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”).  The test requires 
the scientific evidence be relevant and reflect good science derived through sound 
methodology.  Id. at 596–601. 
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show they have standing to do so.63  This is likely to be a hotly contested 
issue. 
Current gene editing techniques are likely to be applied at the embryo 
stage, as cells at the fetus stage have differentiated too much for current 
gene editing technologies to be effective.  That said, several new gene 
editing techniques are being developed that hold promise for application at 
the fetus stage.  The time during pregnancy when these treatments are 
applicable is likely the stage at which the child’s legal rights will be 
decided. 
Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, if standing is analyzed at 
the time of genetic testing or when gene editing is rejected, the child likely 
will not have standing, as the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade held “the 
word ‘person’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the 
unborn.”64  However, both Roe and its progeny acknowledge a significant 
state interest in protecting a viable fetus’s life, which could lead future 
courts to expand fetal rights.65 
 
B. Potential Causes of Action 
 
1. Parents’ Duty of Care to the Child 
 
Generally, U.S. law does not impose an affirmative duty to act upon an 
individual (“General Rule”).66  This is subject to several exceptions created 
 
 63.  Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 151 (1951) 
(“Limitation on ‘the judicial Power of the United States’ is expressed by the requirement 
that a litigant must have ‘standing to sue . . . .’”). 
 64.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157-58 (1973). 
 65.  Id. at 160 (“The situation therefore is inherently different from marital intimacy, or 
bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education . . . . As 
we have intimated above, it is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some 
point in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that of potential human life, 
becomes significantly involved.  The woman’s privacy is no longer sole and any right of 
privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly.”). 
 66.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 37 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2012) [hereinafter “Third Restatement”]  (“An actor whose conduct has not created a 
risk of physical or emotional harm to another has no duty of care to the other unless a court 
determines that one of the affirmative duties provided in §§ 38–44 is applicable.”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) [hereinafter “Second 
Restatement”] (“The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is 
necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take 
such action.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 illus. 1 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965) (“A 
sees B, a blind man, about to step into the street in front of an approaching automobile. A 
could prevent B from so doing by a word or touch without delaying his own progress. A 
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by common law and legislation.67  Relevant exceptions are discussed 
below. 
 
a. Affirmative Duty Created by Statute  
 
Courts may find an affirmative duty where a federal or state statute 
requires an individual to act for the protection of another in a certain 
circumstance.68 
 
i. Child Abuse 
 
One example of legislatively-created affirmative duties for parents are 
child abuse laws (and related reporting requirements).  These laws, which 
have been implemented in every state,69 usually define child abuse as an act 
(1) by a parent or caregiver who is responsible for a child’s (under 18 years 
of age) welfare, (2) that affects the child, and (3) which results in imminent 
risk or serious harm to a child’s health and welfare.70  While child abuse is 
usually proven by affirmative actions, some courts have held omissions can 
also lead to criminal culpability.71 
The parents in the Hypothetical could be found criminally culpable for 
child abuse.  The mother’s decision not to have gene editing performed 
would be an omission that resulted in the child being born with severe 
Huntington’s disease, which poses an imminent risk to the child’s health 
 
does not do so, and B is run over and hurt. A is under no duty to prevent B from stepping 
into the street, and is not liable to B.”). 
 67.  See, e.g., Phillips v. Deihm, 541 N.W.2d 566, 573 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (“A duty 
can arise by statute, as well as by common law.”); State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780, 785 
(N.C. 1982) (“Where the common law has imposed affirmative duties upon persons 
standing in certain personal relationships to others, such as the duty of parents to care for 
their small children, one may be guilty of criminal conduct by failure to act or, stated 
otherwise, by an act of omission.”). 
 68.  Third Restatement, supra note 66, § 38. 
 69.  Child Abuse Laws State-by-State, FINDLAW, http://family.findlaw.com/child-
abuse/child-abuse-laws-state-by-state.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2018); see also Pamela 
Newell Williams, A Comparison of Child Advocacy Laws in Abuse and Neglect Cases in 
England and the United States, 31 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 33, 39 (2008).  
 70.  Child Abuse Overview, FINDLAW, http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-charges/ 
child-abuse-overview.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2017). 
 71.  See e.g., Phillips, 541 N.W.2d at 573 (finding a grandmother breached her duty of 
care to a grandchild because the grandmother failed to “act reasonably to prevent the sexual 
abuse of that child”). 
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and welfare.72  A child’s recovery for child abuse, however, would be much 
less likely because most child abuse and neglect statutes do not create a 
private cause of action.73  Several jurisdictions do, however, have statutes 
that provide for either express or implied private causes of action.74 
 
ii. Child Neglect 
 
Under child neglect laws, many states also vest parents with an 
affirmative, non-delegable duty to provide adequate medical care to their 
children.75  What constitutes adequate medical care differs between states.  
New York defines adequate medical care as the degree of care provided by 
a prudent, loving parent who is anxious for the well-being of the child.76  
Whether this standard has been met depends upon the child’s condition, the 
possibility of a cure or prevention (and the risk associated with such 
treatment), and, if the parents have sought alternative treatment, whether 
such treatment is recommended by reasonable medical authorities.77 
 
 72.  See supra text accompanying note 15.  As noted in the Hypothetical, this paper 
presupposes that the gene editing treatment offered to the mother is safe and does not pose a 
significant risk to the mother. 
 73.  Marc A. Franklin & Matthew Ploeger, Of Rescue and Report: Should Tort Law 
Impose a Duty to Help Endangered Persons and Abused Children?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 991, 1022 (2000) (“Most courts . . . have declined to find a civil duty to report child 
abuse, whether based on the reporting statute or common law.”); see, e.g., Marquay v. Eno, 
662 A.2d 272, 278 (N.H. 1995) (holding a compulsory child abuse or neglect reporting 
statute did not create a private cause of action because neither the statute nor legislative 
history revealed any such intent); see also Arbaugh v. Bd. of Educ., 591 S.E.2d 235 
(holding a state statute for child abuse reporting did not imply a civil cause of action). 
 74.  Arbaugh, 591 S.E.2d at 239 n.3 (stating there are state statutes for child abuse 
reporting that “expressly create a private cause of action . . . [in] Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa, 
Michigan, Montana, New York and Rhode Island.”); see, e.g., 40 R.I. GEN. LAWS  Ann. § 
40-11-6.1 (West 2004) (providing that in addition to criminal prosecution, a guilty 
defendant can be civilly liable for the damages caused by the failure to report child abuse or 
neglect). 
 75.  See, e.g., Jensen ex rel. Jensen v. Cunningham, 250 P.3d 465, 484–85 (2011) (“The 
state appropriately takes its parens patriae responsibility seriously.  In fact, any person . . . 
who has reason to believe that a child has been subjected to neglect is required to report the 
abuse either to law enforcement or DCFS.  And the statutory definition of neglect includes a 
parent’s failure to provide proper or necessary medical care or any other care necessary for 
the child’s health.  A person required to report who ‘willfully fails to do so’ is subject to 
criminal liability.”); see also In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 655 (1979); cf. People v. 
Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 205–207 (1903); In re Faridah W., 180 A.D.2d 451, 452 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1992). 
 76.  In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d at 654–55. 
 77.  Id. at 656; see also In re Sampson, 37 A.D.2d 668, 668 (1971), aff’d, 29 N.Y.2d 
900 (1972); In re Faridah, 180 A.D.2d at 452; In re Cicero, 101 Misc.2d 699, 702 (1979). 
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The court in In re Christine M. considered whether a father’s failure to 
have his four-year-old daughter vaccinated for measles, when a New York 
statute required it, made the daughter a “neglected child.”78  The court held 
that facilitating a child’s measles vaccination constitutes sound and 
necessary medical care, and therefore the father’s failure to have his 
daughter vaccinated for measles during a measles outbreak (without a valid 
religious exemption) made the daughter a “neglected child” within the legal 
meaning of the statute.79 
If in the proposed Hypothetical there were a compulsory gene editing 
statute, a straight-forward analysis suggests that the parents’ choice to deny 
gene editing treatment for the fetus violated the statute.  Less clear is 
whether the child would be deemed to have been neglected in the absence 
of such a statute.  If in utero gene editing is the only way to effectively treat 
Huntington’s, the child (or state) would have a strong argument that the 
parents neglected the child by failing to provide adequate medical care by 
refusing gene editing.80  This argument would likely succeed if the 
reviewing court utilizes the same analysis as the court in In re Christine M. 
 
 78.  In re Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d 606, 610-11 (Fam. Ct. 1992); See N.Y. FAM. CT. 
ACT § 1012(f) (McKinney 2017) (defining a “neglected child” as one “whose physical, 
mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming 
impaired as a result of the failure of his parent . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care (A) 
in supplying the child with adequate . . . medical . . . care, though financially able to do so or 
offered . . . other reasonable means to do so.”). 
 79.  In re Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d at 618; but see In re Hofbauer 47 N.Y.2d at 654–
55 (where the New York Court of Appeals addressed the same statute on an appeal of a 
petition requesting an eight-year-old child suffering from Hodgkin’s disease be deemed a 
neglected child because the parents had failed to acquiesce to the attending doctor’s 
recommendation that the child be treated with radiation and chemotherapy.  The court held 
the child was not a “neglected child” because his parents had undertaken reasonable efforts 
to ensure the child was provided acceptable medical treatment.  In coming to this 
conclusion, the court considered the justifiable worries of the parents about the harmful 
effects of radiation and chemotherapy, the parents’ securing of qualified doctors to aid in the 
child’s care, that the nutritional treatments being administer by these doctors were 
controlling the child’s condition, and that the child would be administered conventional 
treatments if his condition warranted such).  Despite the finding that the father’s failure to 
get his daughter vaccinated constituted child neglect, the Christine M. court nonetheless 
exercised its discretionary power and did not require the father to facilitate his daughter’s 
vaccination because all evidence indicated the father was a capable and loving parent, there 
was no other evidence of actual neglect (medical, emotional, or educational), and while the 
daughter still faced a risk of contracting measles without vaccination, the measles outbreak 
no longer existed at the time of trial.  In re Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d at 618. 
 80.  The parents may also be liable under child endangerment and/or failure to protect 
laws, which expose individuals to criminal liability for subjecting children to inappropriate 
and/or dangerous situations.  All states have some form of these laws.  See CHILD 
ENDANGERMENT/FAILURE TO PROTECT LAWS, NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION 
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While not the subject of this paper, it is worth noting that a more likely 
alternative to a compulsory gene editing statute might be a state, via the 
legislature or the judiciary, ordering parents with certain predispositions to 
harmful genetic diseases not to procreate unless they undergo a 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis to identify genetic defects within an 
embryo, utilize available gene editing technologies to “fix” the genetic 
defects that are present and which are explicitly enumerated in the state 
statute, and then employ in vitro fertilization to impregnate the host mother. 
 
b. Affirmative Duty Created by Parents’ Creation of Harm 
 
Another exception to the General Rule occurs when an actor’s prior 
conduct “creates a continuing risk of physical harm of a type characteristic 
of the conduct,” thereby giving rise to a duty for the actor to “exercise 
reasonable care to prevent or minimize the harm.”81  The child may argue 
his or her suffering from Huntington’s is a continuing risk of physical 
harm, as Huntington’s symptoms have varied onset periods, and present 
themselves along a spectrum of severity.82 
Such harm would be “characteristic of the conduct” because the parents 
intentionally83 showed wanton disregard for the welfare of the potential 
child by deciding to procreate, despite knowing that any resulting progeny 
would have at least one dominant mutant allele, and therefore have 
Huntington’s disease.84  Even if the parents argue neither one knew they 
were homozygous dominant, let alone heterozygous dominant, the parents’ 
progeny inheriting Huntington’s disease might still have been foreseeable 
to impose an affirmative duty.85  This might be the case where both parents 
have a familial history of Huntington’s, and therefore would be remiss in 
 
2-5 (Aug. 2014), https://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/Child-Endangerment-2014_-8_25_ 
2014_FINAL.pdf. 
 81.  Third Restatement, supra note 66, § 39.  The actor’s conduct must be sufficiently 
connected with the potential for future harm to justify the imposition of such an affirmative 
duty.  Id. 
 82.  See supra text accompanying note 15. 
 83.  Third Restatement, supra note 66, § 39.  While an actor does not need to know his 
or her conduct created a risk of harm to raise a duty created by this exception, an objectively 
foreseeable risk of harm must exist.  Id. § 39 cmt. a; see, e.g., Grover v. Stechel, 45 P.3d 80 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (requiring that the harm be foreseeable before an affirmative duty is 
imposed under Second Restatement of Torts § 321). 
 84.  Third Restatement, supra note 66, § 39 cmt. c (“There must be a similar 
relationship between the risk-creating conduct and the harm . . . the harm that occurs must 
be closely enough related to the risks created by the conduct to justify imposition of a 
duty.”). 
 85.  Whether the harm is foreseeable is a question of fact for the jury.  Id. § 39 cmt. d. 
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not getting checked for Huntington’s before they procreated.  However, if 
both parents carry the trait, they should display symptoms, albeit perhaps 
not until later in their lives, potentially after the point at which they have 
procreated in the Hypothetical. 
If harm to the child is deemed foreseeable, and in utero gene editing is 
the only cure or treatment for Huntington’s, then the parents would have 
likely breached their duty to “exercise reasonable care to prevent or 
minimize the harm” by not pursuing gene editing treatment.86   
However, even if the parents’ actios create a harm that raises an 
affirmative duty of the type described above, the court may nonetheless 
decide not to impose an affirmative duty, if doing so involves “special 
problems of principle or policy.”87  Whether a judge exercises this 
discretion will be determined on a case-by-case basis.  That said, parents’ 
religious beliefs, as well as parental rights regarding reproduction and 
related medical decisions, are likely to be compelling and thus considered 
“special problems of principle or policy.” 
 
c. Affirmative Duty Created By “Special Relationship” 
 
An affirmative duty may also be imposed where an actor is in a 
“special relationship”88 with another, and therefore owes that individual a 
duty of reasonable care “with regard to risks that arise within the scope of 
the relationship.”89  Parent-child relationships have been deemed “special 
relationships” in many cases.90  Whether a “special relationship” exists and 
 
 86.  Id. § 39.  Third Restatement notes that “[i]f the injured person is as capable as the 
actor of taking steps to mitigate further harm, the actor does not breach the duty of 
reasonable care by failing to take those steps.”  Id. § 39 cmt. e.  However, such is not the 
case in the Hypothetical put forth in this paper, as an embryo cannot take steps to mitigate 
the harm (such as agreeing to gene editing) caused to the embryo by the parents’ decision to 
get pregnant and reject gene editing. 
 87.  Third Restatement, supra note 66, § 39 cmt. b. 
 88.  See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court, 413 P.3d 656, 664 (2018) 
(“Generally, the [special] relationship has an aspect of dependency in which one party relies 
to some degree on the other for protection . . . . [and is present] where the plaintiff is 
particularly vulnerable and dependent upon the defend and, who correspondingly, has some 
control over the plaintiff’s welfare.”). 
 89.  Third Restatement, supra note 66, § 40(a); see, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the 
University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425 (1976).  This duty attaches regardless of the source 
of the risk.  Third Restatement, supra note 66, § 40 cmt. g. 
 90.  See generally Second Restatement, supra note 66, §315; see, e.g., State v. 
Williquette, 129 Wis.2d 239 (1986) (“When a special relationship exists between persons, 
however, social policy may impose a duty to protect.  The relationship between a parent and 
a child exemplifies a special relationship where the duty to protect is imposed.”); but see 
Third Restatement, supra note 66, § 40(a)–(b) (excluding the parent-child relationship as a 
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the scope of duty flowing from any such special relationship are questions 
of law to be determined by the court.91 
In answering such questions with regard to the parents, courts will look 
to the nature of the parties’ relationship, and whether the plaintiff in the 
Hypothetical was within the zone of foreseeable harm.92 
The best-known case for determining the existence of a “special 
relationship” is Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California.93  The 
court in Tarasoff addressed whether a psychologist, who had been told on 
multiple occasions by a severe paranoid schizophrenic patient that the 
patient planned to kill a fellow student, had an affirmative duty to the 
potential victim (or their family) that required the physician to breach 
doctor-patient confidentiality and warn the potential victim of the likely 
impending harm.94 
In doing so, the court noted that when circumstances require an actor to 
take affirmative action to avoid a foreseeable harm (e.g., warning someone 
about the likely conduct of another) the actor is usually only liable if they 
have a “special relationship” with (1) the dangerous individual or (2) the 
potential victim.95  The psychologist was found to have a “special 
relationship” with the dangerous patient,96 which thereby imposed upon the 
psychologist an affirmative duty to use reasonable care to protect the 
student.97  The psychologist breached this duty by failing to warn the 
potential victim of the patient’s plan (which the patient ended up executing, 
bringing about this case).98 
 
“special relationship”).  Other examples of “special relationships” include psychologist-
patient and warden-prisoner.  See Second Restatement § 315. 
 91.  John B. v. Superior Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 316, 324 (2006) (“The existence of a legal 
duty is a question of law for the court.”); see also State v. Neumann, 348 Wis.2d 455, 506 
(2013). 
 92.  Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 344 (1928) (“The risk reasonably 
to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed . . . .”); see also Johnson v. Jamaica Hosp., 62 
NY2d 523, 527 (1984) (“The damaged plaintiff must be able to point the finger of 
responsibility at a defendant owing, not a general duty to society, but a specific duty to 
him.”). 
 93.  See generally Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d 425. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. at 434. 
 96.  Id. at 435–36. 
 97.  Id. at 439 (“[O]nce a therapist does in fact determine, or under applicable 
professions standards reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses a serious 
danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the 
foreseeable victim of that danger.  [T]he therapist owes a legal duty not only to his patient, 
but also to his patient’s would-be victim and is subject in both respects to scrutiny by judge 
and jury.”). 
 98.  Id. 
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In deciding Tarasoff, the California Supreme Court set out seven 
factors to determine the existence of a “special relationship,” and extent of 
a resulting affirmative duty.  These factors are: 
 
(1) foreseeability of harm . . ., (2) degree of certainty that the 
plaintiff suffered injury, (3) closeness of the connection between 
the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, (4) moral blame 
attached to the defendant’s conduct, (5) policy of preventing future 
harm, (6) extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences 
to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with 
resulting liability for breach, and (7) availability, cost, and 
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.99 
 
In the Hypothetical the child’s injury (Huntington’s) was diagnostically 
certain, and foreseeable as the parents knew, or should have known, any 
fetus they caused to be conceived would have the disorder.  The parents’ 
decision to procreate despite this knowledge, and then to reject gene editing 
(the one way to mitigate the harm), is directly connected to the child’s 
injury and therefore likely will draw significant moral blame.100   
Courts have also interpreted criminal laws to characterize a parent-
child relationship as “special,” and as one that imposes an affirmative duty 
to protect.101  Some examples include requiring the parent to: (1) report 
suspected child neglect or abuse,102 (2) attempt to remove a child from an 
abusive living situation,103 and (3) obtain needed medical care for the 
 
 99.  Id. at 434. 
 100.  Some might argue the mother’s decision to reject gene editing does not deserve 
moral blame, as such a decision is within her rights to bodily autonomy and to make 
pregnancy-related decisions. 
 101.  Williquette, 385 N.W.2d at 150 (Wis. 1986) (the “relationship between a parent 
and a child exemplifies a special relationship where the duty to protect is imposed”). 
 102.  See Jessica R. Givelber, Imposing on Witnesses to Child Sexual Abuse: A Futile 
Response to Bystander Indifference, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3169, 3181 (1999) (finding all 50 
states have enacted mandatory child abuse reporting statutes). 
 103.  One review noted that the courts in these cases “determined that their state’s 
legislature intended to treat a parent’s failure to act in the same way that it would punish the 
affirmative act of abuse . . . .  [T]he courts and legislatures have sent a strong message to 
parents about their responsibility toward their children. If parents do not take action to 
prevent abuse, they may face criminal liability.”  Mary Kate Kearney, Breaking the Silence: 
Tort Liability for Failing to Protect Children from Abuse, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 405, 434 (1994); 
see, e.g., Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145, 261 (holding that mother leaving her children with 
their abusive father was sufficient to trigger criminal liability for child abuse). 
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child.104  Despite the criminal liability that may result from a breach of 
these duties,105 most states make available to parents some type of religious 
exemption regarding medical care.106  Furthermore, as is the case in the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts Subsection II(B)(1)(b), a court may decide, 
based on “special problems of principle or policy” to either impose no duty 
or only a duty of reasonable care.107  The same policy reasons in Subsection 
II(B)(1)(b) are likely to be compelling. 
 
2. State Mandated Medical Care 
 
The state in the Hypothetical might argue that it may constitutionally 
impose compulsory gene editing, regardless of parental, privacy, or 
religious rights.  The Supreme Court has held parents’ traditionally honored 
right to rear their children according to the parents’ personal and religious 
beliefs is superseded when either the health or safety of the child is 
threatened, or when the parents’ conduct poses a substantial threat to public 
safety.108  The government’s ability to interfere in such instances is usually 
based upon the parens patriae doctrine109 or upon each state’s general 
police power to promote public welfare.110  In supporting its argument for a 
compulsory gene-editing law, the state may analogize its efforts to 
compulsory vaccination laws (repeatedly found to be constitutional), and 




 104.  See State v. Cacchiotti, 568 A.2d 1026, 1026-27, 1031 (R.I. 1990) (upholding 
conviction for involuntary manslaughter of a mother who failed to seek medical attention 
for her son after he was severely beaten by mother’s boyfriend). 
 105.  See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. §261.109 (Vernon 2015) (defining knowing 
failure to report child abuse or neglect as class A misdemeanor). 
 106.  See infra Subsection II.C.2; see also Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: 
The Family, Religious Education, and Harm to Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 111 
(2000) (“Most states, however, exempt religious parents from prosecution, or limit their 
exposure to criminal liability, when their failure to seek medical care for their sick or injured 
children is motivated by religious belief.”). 
 107.  Third Restatement, supra note 66, § 40 cmt. b. 
 108.  Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944); see also Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972); Jehovah’s 
Witnesses v. King County Hospital, 390 U.S. 598 (1968). 
 109.  Under this doctrine, the state may act as a guardian “for those who are unable to 
care for themselves, such as children or disabled individuals.” Parens Patriae, LEGAL INFO. 
INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/parens_patriae (last visited Nov. 6, 2017). 
 110.  Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-69; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 
(1982). 
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a. Compulsory Vaccination Laws 
 
All 50 states have passed some form of compulsory vaccination law for 
children attending public schools.111  Both times the Supreme Court has 
addressed these types of laws, they have been found to be a valid exercise 
of a state’s police power, aimed at promoting public health or safety.112 
In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Court found the state legislature had 
the discretion to enact a compulsory smallpox vaccination statute under its 
police power because the state did so in response to a smallpox outbreak 
that “imperiled the entire population” and the compulsory vaccination had 
a “real [and] substantial relation to the protection of the public health and 
the public safety.”113 
In Zucht v. King, the Court upheld a city ordinance114 providing for 
compulsory vaccination for all schoolchildren, regardless of whether an 
immediate threat of an epidemic existed (as was the case in Jacobson).115  
The Court rejected plaintiff’s due process arguments, holding “the 
municipality may vest in its official’s broad discretion in matters affecting 
the application and enforcement of a health law.”116 
After Jacobson and Zucht, several federal117 and state118 courts have 
come to similar conclusions finding compulsory vaccination statutes 
 
 111.  Kyra R. Wagoner, Mandating the Gardasil Vaccine: A Constitutional Analysis, 5 
IND. HEALTH L. REV. 403, 415 (2008). 
 112.  Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-27 (1905) (holding it is within a state’s 
power to enact a compulsory vaccination law); see also Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922). 
 113.  Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31. 
 114.  The ordinance read “no child or any other person shall attend a public school or 
other place of education without having first presented a certificate of vaccination.”  Zucht, 
260 U.S. at 175. 
 115.  Id.  Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit in Workman v. Mingo Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 419 
F. App’x 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2011) held Jacobson’s holding is not limited to diseases that 
present an immediate danger.  This is significant, as the child in the Hypothetical having 
Huntington’s disease would not cause immediate danger to the child, but rather danger when 
the child reaches age of onset, usually in the 30-40 age range.  See infra note 15 and 
accompanying text. 
 116.  Id. at 176 (citing Lieberman v. Van de Carr, 199 U.S. 552 (1905)). 
 117.  See, e.g., McCarthy v. Boozman, 212 F. Supp. 2d 945, 948 (W.D. Ark. 2002) 
(“The constitutional right to freely practice one’s religion does not provide an exemption for 
parents seeking to avoid compulsory immunization for their school-aged children”); see also 
Sherr v. Northport–East Northport Union Free School District, 672 F.Supp. 81, 88 
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (“it has been settled law for many years that claims of religious freedom 
must give way in the face of the compelling interest of society in fighting the spread of 
contagious diseases through mandatory inoculation programs”). 
 118.  See, e.g., Wright v. DeWitt School District, 385 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Ark. 1965) (it is 
within the state’s police power “to require that school children be vaccinated and that such 
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constitutional and within the state’s police power.119  If courts continue to 
follow Zucht’s expanded view of what statutes a state may pass to protect 
the public health under Jacobson, a compulsory gene editing statute that 
addresses circumstances such as those in the Hypothetical, as long as it 
meets other applicable legal tests,120 will likely be found constitutional. 
 
b. Court-ordered Cesarean Sections 
 
While less common in recent times, there is a body of case law 
involving instances where hospitals or physicians have requested court 
orders to force women to have cesarean sections.  For instance, the Georgia 
Supreme Court in Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority 
held a pregnant mother near birth, did not have the right to refuse surgery 
(or other medical treatment) if the fetus’s life was at stake.121 
However, more recent cases have tended to recognize pregnant 
women’s right to refuse medical treatment.  One recent article found that 
the last time an appellate court upheld a trial court’s order for a cesarean 
section was in 1981.122  The court in In re A.C. held a physician must honor 
a competent mother’s decision of whether to get a cesarean section,123 and 
the court in In Re Baby Boy Doe v. Doe held a pregnant mother had a right 
to refuse a physician-suggested cesarean section on religious grounds.124  
The Doe court, in coming to its holding, noted no state statute or case law 
supported the request for a court to mandate the mother undergo a cesarean 
section.125  The Doe court also rejected the argument that Roe v. Wade’s126 
 
requirement does not violate the constitutional rights of anyone, on religious grounds or 
otherwise”); see also Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Ark. 1964) (“According to the 
great weight of authority, it is within the police power of the State to require that school 
children be vaccinated against smallpox, and that such requirement does not violate the 
constitutional rights of anyone, on religious grounds or otherwise”). 
 119.  One review of cases found that “every court to consider challenges to compulsory 
vaccination laws has upheld the statutes.”  Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, 
Compulsory Vaccination Laws are Constitutional, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 589, 603 (2016); see, 
e.g., Workman, 419 F. App’x 348b (the court rejected parents’ claim to a religious right not 
to vaccinate their children, noting “[t]he right to practice religion freely does not include 
liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill 
health”) (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 166–67). 
 120.  See infra Subsection II.C.2. 
 121.  Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cty. Hosp. Auth., 347 Ga. 86 (1981). 
 122.  Farah Diaz-Tello, When the Invisible Hand Wields a Scalpel: Maternity Care in 
the Market Economy, 18 CUNY L. REV. 197, 213 (2015). 
 123.  573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990). 
 124.  260 Ill. App. 3d 392 (1994). 
 125.  Id. at 397. 
FRAZIER_MCCARTHY FINAL MACRO FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/7/2018  4:14 PM 
62 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:1 
emphasis on states’ interest in protecting a viable fetus enabled the state in 
this instance, to mandate the cesarean section.127 
Despite the strong, more recent trend against requiring cesarean 
sections, case law nonetheless conveys some courts’ willingness to order 
intrusive medical procedures during pregnancy.  Gene editing is arguably 
less intrusive on a mother’s rights than a cesarean section, and therefore 
may survive the balancing test applied in the cases cited above.   
 
3. Medical Malpractice-like Causes of Action 
 
The child may look to certain types of existing medical malpractice 
actions for support in bringing a tort claim against his or her parents for 
failure to use gene editing.  All U.S. jurisdictions allow an embryo or fetus 
injured in the womb, who is later born alive, to recover tort damages.128  
While such actions involve a different combination of involved parties, 
they nonetheless are similar enough in nature to the hypothetical scenario 
to be instructive. 
 
a. Harm to Unborn Child 
 
Early decisions denied recovery of tort damages for a child who was 
injured in the womb but was later born alive,129 based on the belief (1) no 
duty was owed to a person who did not yet exist, (2) there was too great a 
problem with causal proof, and (3) there was too significant a danger of 
unfounded claims.130  However, this trend was bucked in Bonbrest v. Kotz, 
where the court held for the first time that a child could recover damages in 
proper prenatal injury cases, reasoning that the common law protections 
previously afforded to a viable fetus in the realms of criminal and abortion 
law should also be extended to viable fetuses with regard to harm to unborn 
children.131  Initially, following Bonbrest, most courts limited recovery to 
situations where the fetus was viable at the time of injury.132  In recent 
 
 126.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 127.  Doe, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 404. 
 128.  Second Restatement, supra note 66, § 869; see also Matthew Browne, 
Preconception Tort Law in an Era of Assisted Reproduction: Applying a Nexus Test for 
Duty, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2555, 2560 (2001). 
 129.  Second Restatement, supra note 66, § 869. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).  The change in Bonbrest was driven by significant 
advancements in our knowledge of embryology and legal commentators’ advocacy to 
recognize the unborn child as a legal entity.  Id. 
 132.  Browne, supra note 128, at 2560. 
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years, the preponderance of jurisdictions have rejected that requirement, 
opting instead to allow recovery where the injury occurred any time after 
conception.133   
A minority of jurisdictions go as far as to allow recovery of damages 
when the injury occurred before the child’s conception.134  In such cases, a 
child can generally only recover where the defendant’s conduct causing the 
harm is a tortious, 135 legal cause of harm.136  Courts have found conduct to 
be sufficiently “tortious” to impose liability where the conduct was 
intended to harm a mother or the fetus, or negligent with regard to either 
individual.137  The child in the Hypothetical would likely have a viable 
argument that the parents intentionally acted (by becoming pregnant and 
not securing gene editing) in a way they knew, or should have known, 
would result in significant harm to the fetus once he/she has reached the 
onset age of Huntington’s disease.138  The child might also be able to 
successfully argue his or her parents’ acts were so unreasonably and 
recklessly dangerous, in that they knew, or should have known, that their 
progeny had a 100% likelihood of suffering from severe Huntington’s, that 




 133.  Id.; but see Andrews v. Keltz, 838 N.Y.S.2d 363 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (disallowing 
recovery of tort damages for injury to a lab-created human embryo pre-implantation, 
because there was no duty to a pre-implantation human embryo). 
 134.  See, e.g., Martin v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr. Corp., 517 N.W.2d 787, 789 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1994) (providing the following analogy: “[a]ssume a balcony is negligently 
constructed. Two years later, a mother and her one-year-old child step onto the balcony and 
it gives way, causing serious injury to both the mother and the child. It would be ludicrous 
to suggest that only the mother would have a cause of action against the builder but, because 
the infant was not conceived at the time of the negligent conduct, no duty of care existed 
toward the child”); see also Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ill. 
1977). 
 135.  Second Restatement, supra note 66, § 869 cmt. b. 
 136.  Id. § 869 cmt. c. 
 137.  Id. § 869 cmt. b. 
 138.  The harm would not be suffered immediately, as the symptoms of Huntington’s 
disease do not normally present until after the age of 30.  Huntington’s Disease, supra note 
15.  The exceptions to this onset age range are (1) when an individual inherits two mutant 
alleles (as opposed to one), Squitieri et al., supra note 16, and (2) Juvenile Huntington 
Disease, which is caused by a mutation called a trinucleotide repeat in the Huntington 
Disease HTT gene. Juvenile Huntington Disease, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, 
http://rarediseases.info.nih.gov/diseases/10510/juvenile-huntington-disease (last visited Apr. 
11, 2018). 
 139.  Sufficient tortious conduct will also be found where conduct is abnormally 
dangerous enough to impose strict liability.  Second Restatement, supra note 66, § 869 cmt. b. 
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b. Wrongful Life 
 
The child denied gene editing in the Hypothetical may sue his or her 
parents under a “wrongful life” action.  “Wrongful life” actions are usually 
brought by a child born with a disability (or by his or her guardian ad 
litem)140 against a doctor or healthcare provider for medical malpractice.141  
Plaintiffs usually argue defendant(s) acted contrary to common medical 
practice or procedures in not properly diagnosing or disclosing to the 
parents the fetus’s injury or genetic abnormality, thereby foreclosing the 
parents’ right to terminate the pregnancy.142 
Many states do not allow “wrongful life” suits because of public policy 
considerations including (1) the life of a disabled child is better than no life 
at all and (2) the extreme difficulty in calculating damages.143  However, a 
minority of states, such as California, have recognized the legal viability of 
wrongful life suits.144  If gene editing becomes as safe and inexpensive as 
expected in the Hypothetical,145 the child in the Hypothetical would likely 
be able to argue for a duty to use gene editing by drawing a strong analogy 
between the existing medical malpractice standards and his or her situation.  
 
 140.  An individual who can be appointed by a court to protect the interests of an 
individual involved in a lawsuit, who cannot adequately represent his or her own interests. 
Guardian Ad Litem, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/guardian_ad 
_litem (last visited Nov. 18, 2017). 
 141.  Wrongful Life Lawsuits, BIRTH INJ. JUST., https://www.birthinjuryjustice.org/types-
of-birth-injuries/wrongful-life-lawsuits/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2017). 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id.  Courts have often referred to this idea as the “utter void of non-existence.”  Id.; 
see, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28 (1967), abrogated by Berman v. Allan, 404 
A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979) (“Damages are measured by comparing the condition plaintiff would 
have been in, had the defendants not been negligent, with plaintiff’s impaired condition as a 
result of the negligence.  The infant plaintiff would have us measure the difference between 
his life with defects against the utter void of nonexistence, but it is impossible to make such 
a determination.  This Court cannot weigh the value of life with impairments against the 
nonexistence of life itself”) (emphasis added); see also White v. U.S., 510 F.Supp. 146, 148 
(1981) (“A cause of action brought by the “wrongfully born” child has been rejected in most 
jurisdictions as uncompensable because it is impossible to measure the damages for his life 
against the utter void of nonexistence”) (emphasis added) (citing Stills v. Gratton, 55 
Cal.App.3d 698 (1976); Dumer v. St. Michael’s Hospital, 69 Wis.2d 766 (1975); Zepeda v. 
Zepeda, 41 Ill.App.2d 240 (1963), cert. denied 379 U.S. 945, (1964)). 
 144.  Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life 
Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 161 (2005). 
 145.  This is more likely to happen for IVF, PGD screened embryos, than it is for 
naturally conceived embryos in utero.  See Ian Sample, IVF Technique that Tests Embryos 
for Genetic Disorders Has First Success, GUARDIAN (July 27, 2014, 7:01 PM), 
http://www.theguardian/com/society/2014/jul/28/ivf-genetic-disorder-check-first-pregnan 
cy-embryo-london. 
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The parents’ decision to refuse gene editing despite knowing their fetus 
would have severe Huntington’s, is likely to constitute action contrary to 
common parental practices in similar situations. 
 
C. Potential Parental Defenses 
 
While the parents may raise a host of procedural arguments,146 the 
following sections focus on substantive defenses commonly raised by 
parents involved in similar actions to the type discussed above. 
 
1. Parental Immunity Doctrine 
 
The hypothetical parents might argue they are protected by the Parental 
Immunity Doctrine.  This doctrine, created in Hewlett v. George, posits that 
children cannot sue their parents (and vice-versa) in civil suits.147  Although 
the court in Hewlett does not cite to any authority to support this doctrine, 
41 other states subsequently adopted some form of the immunity.148 
However, the Parental Immunity Doctrine has been significantly 
limited in recent years. 149  In Merrick v. Sutterlin, the court held a child, 
injured by a parent’s negligence in causing a car accident, could sue the 
parent.150  Similarly, the court in Schenk v. Schenk151 held that the Parental 
Immunity Doctrine does not apply where a parent or child willfully, 
wantonly, or as part of criminal conduct, inflicts injury upon the other.152 
 
 146.  See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 147.  Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703 (1891).  This doctrine is in large part based upon 
the public policy of trying to maintain the family structure by not undermining parents’ 
authority over their children.  Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 202 (1968) (“The 
public policy involved is the interest of the State in maintaining harmony, avoiding strife, 
and insuring a proper atmosphere of cooperation, discipline and understanding in the 
family”). 
 148.  Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416, 417 (D.C. 1987) (declining to utilize the doctrine 
of parental immunity). 
 149.  Third Restatement, supra note 66, § 40 cmt. o (“family immunities have long been 
removed as an impediment to [the] development [of case law recognizing affirmative duties 
among family members”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G(1) (1965) 
(“A parent or child is not immune from tort liability to the other solely by reason of that 
relationship”). 
 150.  See Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411 (Wash. 1980). 
 151.  Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199 (1968). 
 152.  Id. at 202 (“Any justification for the rule of parental immunity can be found only 
in a reluctance to create litigation and strife between members of the family unit. While the 
policy might be such justification to prevent suits for mere negligence within the scope of 
the parental relationship public policy should not prevent a minor from obtaining redress for 
willful and wanton misconduct on the part of a parent”) (internal quotations omitted). 
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The significant deterioration of the Parents Immunity Doctrine makes 
the parents’ successful utilization of the doctrine to bar a child’s claim 
based on failure to use gene editing unlikely unless the parents live in one 
of the few jurisdictions still allowing the doctrine to be employed in limited 
types of actions.153 
 
2. Free Exercise of Religion 
 
The parents might argue they have a right to refuse compulsory gene 
editing because it unduly infringes upon their First Amendment religious 
liberty freedoms.  The First Amendment reads in part, “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.”154  This encompasses two concepts: freedom to believe155 
and freedom to act.156  While the freedom to believe is absolute, the 
Supreme Court has noted an individual’s “[c]onduct remains subject to 
regulation for the protection of society,”157 as long as the regulatory power 
is exercised to attain a permissible end, and in doing so, does not unduly 
infringe the protected freedom.158   
Parents asserting a free exercise of religion defense may have to deal 
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, which 
held a religiously neutral and generally applicable law will not be found to 
 
 153.  See, e.g., Squeglia v. Squeglia, 661 A.2d 1007 (Conn. 1995) (holding the doctrine 
of parental immunity bars actions based on negligence or strict liability); see also Frye v. 
Frye, 505 A.2d 826, 839 (Md. 1986) (declining to repeal the application of parental 
immunity in negligence cases); Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801, 805 (Ala. 1992) 
(endorsing application of parental immunity to negligence claims against defendant foster 
parents and government agencies (deemed to be acting in loco parentis)); Amy L. Nilsen, 
Comment, Speaking Out Against Passive Parent Child Abuse: The Time Has Come to Hold 
Parents Liable for Failing to Protect Their Children, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 253, 285 (2000) 
(noting that Texas’s doctrine of parental immunity “will continue to bar a child’s recovery 
from a passive parent as long as courts continue to narrowly interpret its exceptions”). 
 154.  U.S. Const. amend. I. 
 155.  Preventing US laws from pressuring or coercing any individual to accept a 
particular form of worship, and thereby providing individuals the freedom to choose 
whatever religious form they want.  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
 156.  Protecting an individual’s free exercise of his or her chosen form of religion.  Id. 
 157.  Id.; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (“Laws are made 
for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and 
opinions, they may with practices.  Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a 
necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil 
government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice?”). 
 158.  Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304 (“the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in 
attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom”). 
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have violated the Free Exercise Clause.159  The hypothetical gene-editing 
law is generally applicable160 (although only triggered by fetal genetic 
abnormalities) and is religiously neutral in that it does not target, nor 
benefit, any religion. 
Employment Division was seemingly superseded by the subsequent 
passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”),161 
which sought to “provide greater protection for religious exercise than is 
available under the First Amendment.”162  However, the Supreme Court 
held in City of Boerne v. Flores that the RFRA, which Congress sought to 
apply to the States and their subdivisions via Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, was unconstitutional as applied to states as it exceeded 
Congress’ powers under that provision.163  The RFRA does, however, 
continue to apply to the federal government.164 
Congress responded to the decision in Boerne by enacting The 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”),165 
which applies to the States and their subdivisions and invokes 
congressional authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses.166  The 
RLUIPA is narrower in scope than the RFRA, concerning two areas of 
government activity not involved in the proposed hypothetical: land use 
regulation,167 and religious exercise by institutionalized persons.168 
 
 159.  494 U.S. 872 (1990); see also Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 119, at 609 
(“no matter how much a law burdens religious practices, it is constitutional under Smith so 
long as it does not single out religious behavior for punishment and was not motivated by a 
desire to interfere with religion”). 
 160.  Even if the parents successfully argue the law is not “generally applicable,” the 
court in Zucht dispelled the belief that a lack of general applicability means the law violates 
equal protection.  Zucht, 260 U.S. at 176–77 (“A long line of decisions by this court had 
also settled that in the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may be freely 
applied, and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection clause merely because it 
is not all-embracing”). 
 161.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.   
 162.  Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859–60 (2015) (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760–61 (2014)).   
 163.  521 U.S. 507, 532–36 (1997). 
 164.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418, 418 (2006) (“Among other things, RFRA prohibits the Federal Government from 
substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion.”) (emphasis added); see also 
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2759 (We hold that the regulations that impose this obligation violate 
RFRA, which prohibits the Federal Government from taking any action that substantially 
burdens the exercise of religion unless that action constitutes the least restrictive means of 
serving a compelling government interest.”) (emphasis added). 
 165.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(b). 
 166.  Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 860 (2015). 
 167.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. 
 168.  See id. at § 2000cc–1. 
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Smith also established that neutral and generally applicable laws are 
analyzed using the highly deferential rational basis test, which requires (1) 
the challenged statute have a legitimate state interest, and (2) the 
government be able to show a reasonable, rational connection between the 
statute’s means and its goals.169  Using gene editing to treat otherwise 
incurable diseases clearly falls under the recognized legitimate interest of 
public health,170 and there is a strong argument that in utero gene editing 
done to fix a genetic abnormality that can only be addressed during the 
embryonic stage of development, is a reasonable and rational means by 
which to achieve the public health interest.  If courts address compulsory 
gene-editing in the same way they have addressed compulsory vaccination, 
the parents’ argument will likely fail.171 
 
3. Religious Exemptions 
 
The parents may also argue compulsory gene-editing intrudes on the 
right to practice their chosen religion and therefore requires a 
constitutionally-driven religious exemption to the duty to use gene editing.  
The viability of this argument likely depends upon whether the 
hypothetical state legislature created such an exemption, for as the Supreme 
Court noted in Smith, religious exemptions should be created by the 
legislature, not by the judiciary.172  Religious exemptions, while 
constitutional if narrowly tailored, are not required by the Free Exercise 
Clause, where the statute in question is religiously neutral and generally 
applicable, such as a law governing drug use.173  Some courts have even 
found religious exemptions to be unconstitutional.174 
 
 169.  494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990); see also Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 
1999) (“In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court analyzed a free exercise of religion 
claim under a rational basis test. Under this test, a rationally based, neutral law of general 
applicability does not violate the right to free exercise of religion even though the law 
incidentally burdens a particular religious belief or practice.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 170.  See discussion supra Subsection II.B.2.a. 
 171.  See discussion supra Subsection II.B.2.a.  Both times the Supreme Court has 
addressed compulsory vaccination laws, it has noted these laws are neutral and generally 
applicable because they apply to all citizens in a given jurisdiction and are not motivated by 
a desire to interfere with religious practices. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 119, at 
610. 
 172.  Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 119, at 609. 
 173.  Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (holding that state legislatures may enact narrowly tailored 
religious exceptions to such affirmative duties without violating the Constitution’s 
establishment clause). 
 174.  See, e.g., Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218 (Miss. 1979) (finding a religious 
exemption unconstitutional because it was only available to members of recognized 
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In the case of criminal laws relating to parents failing to seek medical 
care for their sick or injured children, many states have enacted full or 
partial religious exemptions for parents that have failed to do so for 
religiously motivated reasons.175   
However, such issues are murkier with regard to civil liability.  Once 
again, it is instructive to examine compulsory vaccination statutes, which 
are usually accompanied by religious exemptions available to those who 
(1) hold a religious belief that is against the mandated action, and (2) 
sincerely hold that religious belief.176  To meet this, and similar, tests, the 
opposition of the party requesting the religious exemption must “stem from 
religious conviction and have not merely been framed in terms of religious 
belief so as to gain the legal remedy desired.”177  Whether a belief is 
“sincerely held” is a question of fact for the trial court,178 aimed at granting 
 
denominations); see also Davis v. State, 451 A.2d 107, 113 (Md. 1982) (holding a religious 
exemption clause to the state’s compulsory vaccination statute violated the First 
Amendment’s establishment clause because the exemption was only available to children 
whose parents were members of a recognized religious denomination). For a more in-depth 
analysis of similar arguments, see Allan J. Jacobs, Do Belief Exemptions to Compulsory 
Vaccination Programs Violate the Fourteenth Amendment?, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 73 (2011). 
 175.  Garnett, supra note 106 (“Most states, however, exempt religious parents from 
prosecution, or limit their exposure to criminal liability, when their failure to seek medical 
care for their sick or injured children is motivated by religious belief”). 
 176.  Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 92, 94 (finding that with regard to state-required 
vaccinations, religious exemptions are usually available to those who (1) hold a religious 
belief that is against vaccination (opposed to being against vaccinations because of medical 
or moral reasons), and (2) sincerely hold the religious belief in (1)); see also Shaun P. 
McFall, Vaccination & Religious Exemptions, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (Aug. 18, 2008), 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/vaccination-religious-exemptions/ (noting that states 
often utilize one of three standards for religious exemptions, including: (1) the requesting 
parents must be members of a religious organization that is recognized and that opposes 
vaccination, (2) the requesting parents must show a sincere and genuinely held religious 
belief opposing one or all of the required vaccinations, (3) the requesting parents must sign a 
statement confirming they want an exemption because of a religious-based opposition to 
vaccination). 
 177.  Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 94. 
 178.  U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965); see, e.g., Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 96-97 
(finding one pair of plaintiffs’ views to be religious but not sincerely held because one of the 
plaintiffs joined a religious organization for the sole purpose of obtaining a religious 
exemption, and because the pair had previously requested a vaccination requirement 
exemption based on science, safety, and conscience justifications.  Finding another pair of 
plaintiffs’ views to be religious and sincerely held because the plaintiffs’ religiously-driven 
“conception of human existence and the physical world seems to pervade their whole way of 
life,” and because one of the plaintiff’s impressed upon the court “the seriousness with 
which he ha[d] contemplated the foundations of his religious beliefs and their implications 
for his family’s daily life . . . .”).  One court has noted an “adherent’s belief would not be 
‘sincere’ if he acts in a manner inconsistent with the belief” or “if there is evidence that the 
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exemptions only to those whose beliefs’ are held as a matter of 
conscience.179  Courts typically give significant weight to witnesses’ 
demeanor and apparent candor.180  Such inquiries are usually difficult for 
courts, and often teeter on the edge of violating the First Amendment.181 
Therefore, if the state in the Hypothetical has a religious exemption to 
compulsory gene editing, the parents’ ability to successfully request that 
exemption would be dependent upon their religious beliefs, and how they 
testified.  However, if the state in the Hypothetical did not have a religious 
exemption to the compulsory gene editing law, the parents would likely be 
unsuccessful in arguing they have a constitutional guarantee to an 
otherwise generally applicable, religiously neutral statute. 
 
4. Constitutionally-protected Privacy Rights 
 
The parents might also argue that compulsory gene editing violates the 
mother’s Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy recognized in Griswold v. 
Connecticut,182 and utilized by the court in Roe v. Wade to vest pregnant 
women with a constitutionally-protected right to abort their pregnancies 
 
adherent materially gains by fraudulently hiding secular interests behind a veil of religious 
doctrine.”  Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 441 (1981). 
 179.  Barber, 650 F.2d at 441 (noting the goal of the “sincerity analysis”—aimed at 
determining a requesting party’s subjective good faith - is to “protect only those beliefs 
which are held as a matter of conscience . . . [I]t is frequently difficult to separate this 
inquiry from a forbidden one involving the verity of the underlying belief . . . an adherent’s 
belief would not be ‘sincere’ if he acts in a manner inconsistent with the belief . . . or if there 
is evidence that the adherent materially gains by fraudulently hiding secular interests behind 
a veil of religious doctrine.”). 
 180.  Lewis v. Sobol, 710 F. Supp. 506, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding mother’s 
testimony to be “sincere, direct, and very credible”); see also Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 96-97 
(finding one pair of the plaintiffs’ manifested “complete sincerity”). 
 181.  Barber, 650 F.2d at 430.  Courts have struggled to define what “religion” and 
“religious beliefs” mean.  The Supreme Court has held “religion” to involve the “ultimate 
concerns” of individuals, Seeger, 380 U.S. at 187, and stated the “test of belief ‘in relation 
to a Supreme Being’ is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a 
place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.”  Id. at 
165–66. The Second Circuit has expanded upon this idea and noted one criterion of a 
religion is that a believer will categorically disregard elementary self-interest rather than 
transgress the religion’s tenets.  United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 450 (2nd Cir.1985). 
 182.  381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the Bill of Rights has certain penumbras of 
rights, including the right to privacy.  Specifically, the Court held that the right to privacy is 
“fundamental” when it comes to the actions of married couples because such privacy “‘is of 
the character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of 
liberty and justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions’”) (quoting 
Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)). 
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prior to the fetus attaining viability.183  In doing so, the Court in Roe 
acknowledged a pregnant woman’s autonomy over her pregnancy during 
the first trimester and the right to abortion during the second and third 
trimesters subject to varying levels of state control.184 
The mother might argue Roe’s first-trimester blanket autonomy makes 
any compulsory gene-editing statute unconstitutional as applied to her if 
the mother’s genetic testing and the physician’s suggestion of gene-editing 
occurred prior to the end of the first trimester.  However, this argument is 
unlikely to be successful, as most genetic tests are done during the second 
trimester (with a suggestion of gene-editing likely to follow thereafter if 
necessary).185  Even if the mother did get testing during the first trimester, 
the court in Roe stated first-trimester autonomy “is not absolute and is 
subject to some limitations; and that at some point the state interest as to 
protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become 
dominant.”186 
If the mother’s genetic testing occurred during the second trimester, 
Roe likely would be of little help to the mother.  As the Court noted, “the 
State . . . [has an] important and legitimate interest in protecting the 
potentiality of human life”—one which “grows in substantiality as the 
woman approaches term, and at a point during pregnancy . . . becomes 
‘compelling.’”187  The Court noted the state’s interest in protecting fetal life 
after viability is strong enough that a state may proscribe abortion after that 
point.188  If the state’s interest in protecting fetal life is strong enough to 
require a mother to go through childbirth and assume the responsibilities 
associated with motherhood (by not allowing abortion), it is not 
 
 183.  Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (“This right to privacy [(referring in part to the right to privacy 
found in Griswold)], whether it be founded in the Fourth Amendment’s concept of personal 
liberty and restrictions upon state action . . . or . . . in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of 
rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy.”). 
 184.  Nancy K. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE 
L.J. 639, 639–48 (1986).  
 185.  Amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling (CVS) - the two most common types 
of in utero genetic screening - are done between 15 and 20 weeks, and 10 and 13 weeks of 
pregnancy, respectively.  Prenatal Genetic Diagnostic Tests, ACOG (Sept. 2016), https:// 
www.acog.org/Patients/FAQs/Prenatal-Genetic-Diagnostic-Tests. 
 186.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. 
 187.  Id. at 162–63. The Court in Roe went on to clarify the “‘compelling’ point is at 
viability . . . because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside 
the mother’s womb.”  Id. at 163. 
 188.  Id. at 163–64 (“State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both 
logical and biological justifications.  If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after 
viability, it may go as far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is 
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.”). 
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unreasonable to think the state’s interest is also strong enough to impose 
compulsory gene editing in certain situations starting in the second 
trimester (when gene editing is most likely to be used). 
 
5. Constitutionally-protected Parental Rights 
 
The parents in the Hypothetical may argue that compulsory gene 
editing infringes upon their constitutional right to control their child’s 
upbringing.189  However, these traditionally recognized parental rights are 
not absolute.  While there exists a “private realm of family life which the 
state cannot enter,”190 states may pass and enforce a law impinging on these 
rights if such law is necessary to protect the health and/or well-being of 
children.191  An example of this is compulsory vaccination laws, which 
have been analyzed under the rational basis test,192 but are believed by 
many constitutional law experts to meet even the strict scrutiny test.193  If a 
compulsory gene-editing law is analyzed the same way as compulsory 




Gene editing has a myriad of potentially beneficial uses with wide-
ranging implications.194  It could significantly improve public health by 
 
 189.  Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding parents have a substantive due 
process right to make decisions regarding the upbringing of their children); see also Pierce 
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The child is not the mere creature of the 
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high 
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”); Troxel v. Granville, 530 
U.S. 57, 72–3 (2000) (“The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in 
the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental 
liberty interests recognized by this Court.”). 
 190.  Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. 
 191.  Id. at 158 (“[T]he family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest . . . . 
Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may 
restrict the parent’s control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the 
child’s labor and in many other ways.”). 
 192.  See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 193.  Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 119, at 613–14. Strict scrutiny is the highest 
level of scrutiny applied by courts and requires the government to prove (1) the challenged 
law has a compelling state interest, and (2) the law is narrowly tailored to achieve its result.  
See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800 (2006). 
 194.  Potential future uses for CRISPR gene editing include: (1) removing malaria from 
mosquitos, (2) eliminating cancers like lymphoblastic leukemia, (3) treating muscular 
dystrophy, (4) making pig organs suitable for transplantation into humans, (5) treating HIV, 
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eradicating genetically caused disorders, and significantly reduce medical 
costs by foreclosing the need for the long-term care associated with such 
disorders.  Therefore, in building this framework, it is important to first and 
foremost have a solid grasp of how the technology being used impacts the 
implicated legal issues.  Specifically, there must be standing.  As such, a 
comprehensive understanding of embryonic and fetal development, as well 
as what points in time different gene editing technologies can be utilized, 
will be crucial to understanding what legal issues, rights, and duties may be 
implicated.  However, as with most new technologies, gene editing brings 
with it risks, as well as moral and ethical considerations.  These questions 
are not of the yes or no sort—they warrant substantial debate and 
discussion.   
Despite the science fiction-like nature of gene editing, the legal 
framework built to govern its use (and potential misuse) will likely, at least 
initially, be constructed using established legal principles.  It will be 
instructive to consider the scope of existing parent-child duties; policy 
reasons for/against a parents’ criminal or civil liability for prenatal injury; 
and the traditionally recognized constitutional rights of privacy, religious 
liberty, and parental autonomy in raising children.  Balancing these 
interests will be a difficult task, but one that needs to be addressed while 




















and (6) treating genetic mutation-caused blindness.  Jay Bennett, 11 Crazy Gene-Hacking 
Things We Can Do With CRISPR, POPULAR MECHANICS (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.popular 
mechanics.com/science/a19067/11-crazy-things-we-can-do-with-crispr-cas9/. 
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